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Abstract 
Some pieces of empirical evidence suggest that in the U.S., over the last few decades, (i) 
wage inequality between-plants has risen much more than wage inequality within-plants and 
(ii) there has been an increase in the segregation of workers by skill into separate plants. This 
paper presents a frictionless assignment model in which these two features can be explained 
simultaneously as the result of the decline in the relative price of capital. Additional 
implications of the model regarding the skill premium and the dispersion in labor productivity 
across plants are also consistent with the empirical evidence. 
 
 
1 Introduction
It is a well-documented fact that wage inequality in the U.S. labor market has in-
creased substantially over the last few decades.1 In the manufacturing sector, one
important feature of this increase is that it has come almost exclusively from an
increase in the wage inequality between-plants. In this sense, Dunne et al. (2004)
find that "virtually the entire increase in overall dispersion in hourly wages for U.S.
manufacturing workers from 1975 to 1992 is accounted for by the between-plants
components". More specifically, their decomposition of the overall wage inequality
into the within-plants and between-plants wage inequality shows that the former only
increased slightly during this period, while the latter increased in a similar manner
as the overall wage inequality.2 As a consequence, the between-plants wage inequality
increased its share in the overall wage inequality from 53% in 1977 to 64% in 1992.
Assuming that wages are closely related to skill, one could interpret this evidence
as an indication that the composition of U.S. plants has changed over the last few
decades in a way that has increased the segregation of high- and low-skilled work-
ers into separate plants. In this sense, greater segregation would reduce the skill
heterogeneity within the workers of a plant and would make more likely to have
plants composed of either high- or low-skilled workers rather than of both high- and
low-skilled workers. In other words, it would make more likely to have high-skilled
(low-skilled) individuals together with other high-skilled (low-skilled) individuals in
the same plants. Thus intuitively, if wages are closely related to skill, an increase
in the segregation of workers by skill into separate plants would increase the wage
inequality between-plants and would reduce the wage inequality within-plants (or,
when the overall wage inequality is increasing, would increase more the former than
the latter).
Some empirical evidence supports this idea of increasing segregation. For instance,
using worker classification (production/non-production) as a proxy for skill, Kremer
and Maskin (1996) find that, in the U.S. manufacturing sector, production workers
are now more likely to be together in the same plants. In particular, they consider a
segregation index that lies between 0 (no segregation) and 1 (maximal segregation)
and find that the segregation of these workers rose from 0.195 to 0.228 between 1976
and 1987.3 They also obtain similar evidence for Britain and France using this and
1For instance, Acemoglu (2002) reports that, while in 1971 a worker at the 90th percentile of the
wage distribution earned 266% more than a worker at the 10th percentile, in 1995 this number was
366%.
2Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) provide similar evidence.
3One could argue that this evidence could be the result of firms reorganizing their tasks across
their plants in such a way that non-production workers and production workers are located in
different plants. This paper does not consider multi-plant firms. However, as long as the purpose
of this intra-firm reallocation of tasks is to improve productivity, this idea would be consistent with
the essence of this paper.
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other proxies for skill (seniority, experience, and other forms of worker classification)
and this leads them to conclude that "wages, experience and worker classification
are all imperfect indicators of skill, but together they paint a consistent picture of
increasing segregation".4
In light of this evidence this paper proposes that both (i) the larger increase in
the wage inequality between-plants than in the wage inequality within-plants, and (ii)
the increase in the segregation of workers by skill observed in the U.S. over the last
few decades can be explained simultaneously by the decline in the relative price of
capital.56 In this sense, Krusell et al. (2000) report that the relative price of capital
equipment (relative to consumption of nondurables and services) fell in the U.S. at
an average rate of about 4.5% per year between 1954 and 1992.7
To illustrate this connection this paper presents a frictionless assignment model
in which the relative price of capital decreases exogenously. In the model, individu-
als with different skill are imperfect substitutes in production and they must assign
themselves to plants and to occupations within those plants. Specifically, the model
assumes that plants are composed of one manager, one worker and a stock of capital.
In production, the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker are complementary,
but they play a non-symmetric role, and there is a form of capital-skill complementar-
ity. In this set up, for a given price of capital, the shape of the equilibrium assignment
(the equilibrium composition of the plants) depends on how strong is the complemen-
tary in production between skills relative to their asymmetry. In particular, stronger
complementarity pushes the equilibrium towards greater segregation of individuals
by skill into different plants.
Then, intuitively, the connection in the model between the decline in the relative
price of capital and (i) and (ii) works in the following way. When the relative price
of capital declines the overall wage inequality increases (due to the capital-skill com-
plementarity in the economy) but also the complementarity in production between
the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker becomes stronger relative to their
asymmetry. This modifies the equilibrium composition of the plants in a way that the
4They rely on Kramarz, Lollivier and Pele (1996) for the French evidence.
5To the best of my knowledge, only for the manufacturing sector there is evidence regarding the
evolution over time of the between-plants and the within-plants wage inequality and of the segregation
of workers by skill. The same happens regarding the dispersion of labor productivity across plants
discussed below. This paper tries to explain this evidence and, in this sense, it concentrates in an
economy with only one sector, the manufacturing sector. Thus, "economy" and "manufacturing
sector" are equivalent in this paper.
6Certainly, many other factors, besides the decline in the relative price of capital, may have
contributed to (i) and (ii) too. For instance, the changes over time in the economy’s skill distribution,
in the level of plant outsourcing, in the role of unions or in the pressure from international trade.
Future work should integrate some of these factors into the analysis.
7Gordon (1990) and Cummins and Violante (2002) provide similar evidence.
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segregation of individuals by skill increases what, in turn, produces a larger increase
in the wage inequality between-plants than in the wage inequality within-plants.8
The model has other interesting predictions. In particular, the model also predicts
that, when the relative price of capital declines, the skill premium and the labor pro-
ductivity dispersion across plants increase. These predictions are broadly consistent
with the empirical evidence. In particular, a large empirical literature documents
an overall increase in the skill premium over the last few decades in the U.S. For
instance, Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) report that the log relative wage of college
and post-college workers to high-school workers went from 0.465 in 1970 to 0.557 in
1996.910 Moreover, Dunne et al. (2004) find that the 90-10 differential of the log
of labor productivity across U.S. manufacturing plants increased from around 1.7 to
around 1.9 during the period 1975-92.
This paper is related to the literature in several ways. To begin with, there is
a large literature that, as in this paper, connects the decline in the relative price of
capital with increases in the overall wage inequality and in the skill premium through
the existence of a form of capital-skill complementarity in production.11 See, for
instance, Krusell et al. (2000) that try to account for the recent evolution of the
skill premium in the U.S. There is also a large literature that, as in this paper, links
the decline in the relative price of capital (or, in many instances, the decline in the
price of the Information Technology) to changes in the internal organization of plants
and/or in their demand of skills. Some examples of this literature are Bresnahan et
al. (2002), Autor et al. (2003), Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2004), and Garicano
and Rossi (2005). This paper contributes to these two strands of the literature by
showing how the decline in the relative price of capital, not only increases the overall
wage inequality and modifies the equilibrium composition of the plants, but also
affects both the between- and the within-plants wage inequality and the extent of
individuals’ segregation by skill.
Moreover, this paper can be thought as complementary with Kremer and Maskin
(1996). In this sense, while this paper analyzes the evolution of individuals’ segrega-
tion by skill and wage inequality in a context of a constant skill distribution and a
8This model simultaneously obtains (i) and (ii). Of course, it is possible to obtain (i) without
(ii), and many models in the literature could potentially do so, but that would miss part of the
evidence mentioned above.
9The evidence in Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) is for all workers in the economy and not only
for manufacturing workers. However, both Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and Dunne et al. (2004)
find that the behavior of the overall wage inequality and of the skill premium for manufacturing
workers closely tracks that for all the workers in the economy.
10Similar evidence is found in many other studies. In particular, Beaudry and Green (2005) find
that the skill premium also increased from the mid-1990s through 2000.
11There is a broad consensus in the empirical literature about the existence of capital-skill com-
plementarity in the economy. See, for instance, Griliches (1969), Hamermesh (1993) or Goldin and
Katz (1998).
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declining relative price of capital, Kremer and Maskin (1996) do the same in a context
of a constant price of capital (in fact, they do not have capital in their model) and a
changing skill distribution. There are some differences though. For instance, Kremer
and Maskin (1996) do not have results regarding the evolution of the between- and
the within-plants wage inequality or the skill premium, and they consider a discrete
skill distribution (it is continuous in this paper). Moreover, the framework proposed
here is rich enough to consider simultaneously both changes in the economy’s skill
distribution and in the relative price of capital.12
Finally, this paper obviously relates to (and benefits from) the assignment lit-
erature, especially to that one studying one-to-one matchings.13 In this paper, in-
dividuals must endogenously divide themselves between managers and workers and
(simultaneously) pair themselves creating plants. Then, in a sense, the assignment
problem here could be considered a two-step assignment.14 Two well-known papers
in the literature with this kind of two-step assignment problem are Kremer (1993)
and Lucas (1978).15 In Kremer (1993) the equilibrium assignment involves complete
segregation of individuals by skill into different plants (the best are paired with best
and the worst with the worst). Instead, in Lucas (1978) in equilibrium there is a
cutoff level of skill such that everybody above that level is a manager and everybody
below it is a worker. A nice feature of the general framework presented in this paper
is that, as illustrated in section 5.4, these two kinds of equilibrium can appear as
extreme cases (when the price of capital is free or infinitely expensive, respectively)
and then it is possible to see the implications for the economy of the transition from
one to the other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the production
technology in the economy. Then, section 3 describes the assignment problem in
the paper and defines the equilibrium. Some basic properties of this equilibrium are
presented in section 4. Then, the equilibrium is fully characterized in sections 5.1-5.3
for a particular version of the model, and section 5.4 shows how that equilibrium
changes as the relative price of capital declines and the implications of that change
in terms of wage inequality and of segregation by skill. Finally, section 6 concludes
the paper.
12Some preliminary work is pursuing this extension.
13Sattinger (1993) and Legros and Newman (2002) are some examples of this literature.
14This feature differentiates this paper from many in the assignment literature where the assign-
ment problem consists on pairing individuals/things that belong to two ex-ante defined groups. For
instance, Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) pair plants with locations, Becker (1973) pairs men with
women and Caselli (1999) pairs workers with machines.
15The assignment problems in these two papers are not exactly the same to the one considered
here. In particular, in Kremer (1993) plants have more than two occupations, and in Lucas (1978)
a manager can hire more than one worker and skill is a two-dimensional variable (there is skill as a
manager and skill as a worker although, in fact, he considers that everyone has the same skill as a
worker).
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2 The production technology
There is only one good in the economy and this is produced by plants. A plant is
composed of one manager, one worker and a stock of capital, and its output is given
by the following production function:16
f(x, z, k) = xµ
£
θkβ + (1− θ) zβ
¤ 1−µ
β (1)
where x denotes the skill of the manager, z is the skill of the worker, k is the
amount of capital in the plant, and µ, θ and β are parameters. In particular, consider
that µ ∈ [1
2
, 1), θ ∈ (0, 1) and β < 0.
This characterization of the production technology has three crucial features that,
as discussed in Kremer and Maskin (1996), are strictly required for the purposes of
this paper:
• Imperfect substitutability. In the description above individuals with different
skills are imperfect substitutes in production. One and only one person can be
in charge of a given occupation within a plant, so it is impossible to substitute
quality (skill) for quantity (number of persons) in that occupation. Imperfect
substitutability is required in this paper in order to obtain implications about
the composition of the plants. In particular, these implications could not be
obtained if individuals with different skills were perfect substitutes in produc-
tion, as they are in the classical efficiency units model. In that case, the output
of a plant could be expressed as a function of an aggregate measure of skill in
the plant. Then, plants with the same aggregate measure of skill would be ob-
servationally equivalent, even though they could have very different workforces.
• Complementarity between skills. In (1) the skill of the manager and the skill
of the worker are complementary in production. This feature of the produc-
tion technology is relevant in order to obtain sensible implications about the
equilibrium composition of the plants. In this sense, the empirical evidence
broadly supports that idea that there is positive sorting among managers and
workers in the economy (the best managers hire the best workers).17 The fact
that ∂
2f(x,z,k)
∂x∂z > 0 delivers this result. Instead, if
∂2f(x,z,k)
∂x∂z < 0 the equilibrium
composition of the plants would involve negative sorting, and if ∂
2f(x,z,k)
∂x∂z = 0
16This convention calls "manager" to one of the members of the plant and "worker" to the other.
This is done just for simplicity. What is really important is that a plant is composed of 2 types
of workers. In this sense, what the model means by workers’ segregation by skill below is simply
individuals’ segregation by skill.
17See, for example, Doms et al. (1997) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
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one could not establish any kind of relationship between the skills of the two
individuals paired together in a plant.
• Asymmetry between skills. In (1) there is an asymmetry in production between
the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker. Basically, they affect the
output of the plant in different ways. Again, this asymmetry is needed to
avoid compositional implications that are not interesting for the purposes of
this paper. In this sense, with a symmetric production technology, in which the
skill of the manager and the skill of the worker affect the output of the plant
in the same way, the equilibrium would always imply, as in Kremer (1993),
no skill heterogeneity within plants, perfect segregation of individuals by skill
into different plants and zero wage inequality within-plants. Moreover, this
asymmetry needs to be introduced in a sensible way. In particular, one could
intuitively expect that, within a plant in equilibrium, the manager is more
skilled than his worker. As it will be clear below, imposing that µ ∈ [1
2
, 1)
delivers this result. For now, just note that when µ ∈ [1
2
, 1), the output produced
by any plant composed of two individuals with different skills is always larger
when the most skilled individual is the manager. Specifically, ∀a > b and
∀k > 0, 18
f(a, b, k) > f(b, a, k) (2)
In addition to these features, note that (1) also shows complementarity in pro-
duction (i) between the skill of the manager and the amount of capital and (ii)
between the skill of the worker and the amount of capital.19 Thus, even though these
conditions are not the conventional way in the literature of introducing capital-skill
complementarity in production, one could say that this model exhibits a form capital-
skill complementarity.20 This is relevant for the results of this paper. In particular,
18Equation (2) is satisfied if, ∀a > b and ∀k > 0, aµ
£
θkβ + (1− θ) bβ
¤ 1−µ
β >
bµ
£
θkβ + (1− θ) aβ
¤ 1−µ
β . This happens if ∂∂s
µ
sµ
[θkβ+(1−θ)sβ ]
1−µ
β
¶
> 0, and this is always the case
when µ ∈ [12 , 1).
19The fact that β < 0 guarantees that there is always complementarity in production between the
skill of the worker and the amount of capital.
20The most usual approach in the literature to introduce capital-skill complementarity is through
a production function with three inputs, skilled labor (S), unskilled labor (U), and capital (K),
in which the direct elasticity of substitution (or, in other cases, the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity
of substitution) between skilled labor and capital (σSK) is lower than between unskilled labor and
capital (σUK). This interpretation of capital-skill complementarity can not be considered here. In
particular, note that in the production function (1) one can not associate x, the skill level of the
manager (or the labor input in the managerial occupation), with the skilled labor input, nor z, the
skill level of the worker (or the labor input in the workers’ occupation), with the unskilled labor
input (and, by extension, one can not associate σxk and σzk with σSK and σUK , respectively).
The reason why this association is not possible is that, as it will be clear below, in many instances
7
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given this complementarity, the decline in the relative price of capital will constitute
a skill-biased technological change that will push wage inequality upwards.
Two additional comments about the particular functional form considered in (1).
First, since there is not a standard production function involving capital in the as-
signment literature, this paper considers a functional form, the combination of a
Cobb-Douglas and a CES, that has been used extensively in the literature to explain
a wide variety of issues. Second, note that there are three possible ways of distribut-
ing x, z and k in a functional form that combines a Cobb-Douglas and a CES: one
could place x outside of the CES, z or k. The option adopted in (1) is not arbitrary.
In particular, leaving k outside of the CES does not work for the purposes of this
paper because, in that case, capital would affect x and z in the same way and, then,
the equilibrium composition of the plants would not be affected by a change in the
relative price of capital.21 Leaving z outside of the CES is not a good choice either
as it could produce some unappealing assignment implications.22 Leaving x outside
of the CES does not present any of these problems and that is why it is the option
adopted in (1).
A final comment about this production technology. Considering that there are
only two occupations within a plant and that skill is a one-dimensional variable is
enough for the purposes of this paper. Assignment models are very demanding analyt-
ically and this strongly pushes for simplicity in the characterization of the production
technology. This is why these two features are very common in the assignment liter-
ature. Obviously, more realism in these dimensions would be better but this would
come at a great analytical cost.
2.1 The production function net of capital costs
The previous section characterized the plants’ production function. However, in order
to define and to characterize the equilibrium in the following sections, it is more
useful to consider the plants’ production function net of the optimal capital costs. In
this sense, consider that plants do not have capital when they are created, but that
they can buy any amount of it at an exogenously given price p. Then, the plants’
production function net of the optimal capital costs can be defined as:
h(x, z, p) ≡ f(x, z, k∗)− pk∗
it happens that in the equilibrium of the economy some plants have both the managerial and the
workers’ occupation filled by unskilled individuals while other plants have both of them filled by
skilled individuals.
21For this same reason, it is not convenient for the purposes of this paper to consider a Cobb-
Douglas production function with inputs x, z and k.
22In particular, under a production function of this type, it could happen that, for some prices
of capital, in some plants with heterogeneous individuals the least skilled ones choose to be the
managers.
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where k∗ is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
k
f(x, z, k)− pk
This function h(x, z, p) replicates the most relevant properties of the function
f(x, z, k) in equation (1). Specifically, h(x, z, p) also (i) increases with the skill of
the manager and with the skill of the worker, (ii) exhibits complementarity in pro-
duction between the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker, and (iii) has
an asymmetry in production between the skill of the manager and the skill of the
worker. In particular, similar to (2), the asymmetry in h(x, z, p) makes that the net
output produced by any plant composed of two individuals with different skill levels
is always larger when the most skilled individual is the manager. Formally, ∀a > b
and ∀p > 0,
h(a, b, p) > h(b, a, p)
Results (i) and (ii) can be easily obtained using the envelope theorem. As for the
last result, it comes directly from equation (2). To see this simply note that (2) implies
that f(a, b, k∗ba)− pk∗ba > f(b, a, k∗ba)− pk∗ba, where k∗ba is the amount of capital that a
plant composed of a manager with skill b and a worker with skill a would optimally
buy. But since, by definition, h(a, b, p) = f(a, b, k∗ab) − pk∗ab ≥ f(a, b, k∗ba) − pk∗ba
and f(b, a, k∗ba) − pk∗ba = h(b, a, p), this implies (iii). As it will be clear below, these
properties of h(x, z, p) will be crucial in determining the features of the economy’s
equilibrium assignment.
3 The assignment problem and the equilibrium
Consider that the economy is populated by a continuum of individuals with different
skill s. In particular, consider that skill is distributed across the population according
to a continuous density function φ(s) defined over the interval [smin, smax]. Further-
more, consider that the assignment of individuals to plants and to occupations is
frictionless. Specifically, everybody’s skill is public information and the movement
of individuals across plants and occupations is costless and it does not require time.
Then, for a given price of capital p, the assignment problem in this paper is to allocate
individuals to plants and to occupations within those plants and to allocate net out-
put (payoff) to individuals in a way that is feasible given the production technology
and the skill distribution and that is stable. Formally, the equilibrium (solution) of
this problem is the combination of:
• An occupational correspondence, Ω : [smin, smax] ⇒ {manager, worker}, that
specifies, for each skill level, the occupational choice of the individuals with that
9
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skill. This in turn defines the sets:
M = {s ∈ [smin, smax] : Ω(s) = manager}
WO = {s ∈ [smin, smax] : Ω(s) = worker}
• A matching function, ψ : M −→ WO, that specifies the way managers are
paired with workers to create plants.23
• A payoff function, W : [smin, smax]→ R, that determines everybody’s payoff.24
such that:
• The payoff structure is feasible. That is, in any plant, the combined payoff of
its members is not greater than the net output they produce:25
W (s) +W (ψ(s)) ≤ h(s, ψ(s), p) ∀s ∈M (3)
• The assignments are feasible. That is, for any type of plant, the mass of man-
agers is equal to the mass of workers:26Z
s∈A
φ(s) ds =
Z
s∈ψ(A)
φ(s) ds for every measurable set of managers A ∈M (4)
• None has an incentive to deviate. That is:
@a, b ∈ [smin, smax] : max {h(a, b, p), h(b, a, p)} > W (a) +W (b) (5)
23To be precise, ψ could be a correspondence instead of a function. However, in the analysis
that follows this is never the case and it is less intuitive to define the equilibrium when ψ is a
correspondence. That is why ψ is considered to be a function here. See Legros and Newman (2002)
for a definition of the equilibrium when ψ is a correspondence.
24This definition already incorporates one equilibrium result. In particular, the equilibrium in
this model requires that individuals with identical skill obtain the same payoff. In other words, W
is a function and not a correspondence.
25Due to condition (5) below, in equilibrium this equation is always satisfied with equality ∀s ∈M .
26Since plants are composed of one manager and one worker, it is unfeasible to pair, for instance,
a mass of managers of measure 13 to a mass of workers of measure
2
3 .
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4 Basic properties of the equilibrium
The equilibrium assignment defined above has several interesting properties that do
not depend on the particular skill distribution, price of capital or values of the para-
meters of the production function considered. These are formally stated in Lemma
1:27
Lemma 1. Regardless of the economy’s skill distribution, the price of capital and
the values of the parameters of the production function, the equilibrium assignment:
(i) always exists,
(ii) maximizes the economy’s aggregate net output among all the feasible assign-
ments,
(iii) requires that the most skilled individual within any plant is the manager,
(iv) involves positive sorting between managers and workers, and
(v) requires a payoff function that is strictly increasing with respect to skill.
The existence and efficiency of the equilibrium assignment should come at no
surprise given the fact that the model does not contain any friction or imperfection.
Instead, (iii) and (iv) come, respectively, from the asymmetry and the complemen-
tarity in production between the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker
imposed in section 2. Finally, the equilibrium payoff function needs to be increasing
with respect to skill because the net output of a plant strictly increases both with
the skill of its manager and with the skill of its worker.
Given the results presented in Lemma 1, only one additional piece of information
is needed to fully characterize the equilibrium assignment: who are managers and
who are workers in equilibrium. Now note that there are two forces in this model
that play a role in determining these sets in equilibrium: the complementarity and
the asymmetry force.28 The former is due to the complementarity in production
between the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker and the latter is due
to the different roles that these skills play in production, as imposed in section 2.
These two forces push in different directions in determining who must be managers
and who must be workers in equilibrium. To understand this, consider the case where
there is complementarity in production between the skill of the manager and the skill
of the worker but not asymmetry. In this case, the equilibrium assignment would
be such that the best individuals would be paired with the best and the worst with
the worst. Then, both low- and high-skilled individuals would be managers (and
workers) in equilibrium and there would be maximal segregation of individuals by
skill into different plants. This is the kind of equilibrium, for instance, in Kremer
(1993). Instead, consider the case where there is asymmetry in production between
27See the Appendix for the proofs of all the Lemmas in this paper.
28These two forces also appear simultaneously, for example, in Kremer and Maskin (1996) and in
Davis (1997).
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the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker (as stated in section 2) but
not complementarity. In this case, the equilibrium assignment would be such that
everybody with skill above the median skill in the population would be a manager
while everybody else would be a worker. This equilibrium partition of individuals
between of occupations is similar to one in Lucas (1978). Then, intuitively, the
complementarity force pushes towards individuals’ segregation by skill into different
plants while the asymmetry force pushes high-skilled individuals into the managerial
occupation inducing lower levels of skill segregation.
These two forces operate simultaneously in this model and, since they push in
different directions in determining who must be managers and who must be workers
in equilibrium, the exact shape of the equilibrium assignment depends on their rela-
tive strengths. These strengths, in turn, depend on the economy’s skill distribution,
on the price of capital and on the values of the parameters of the production func-
tion. Therefore, more structure is needed in order to know who are managers and
who are workers in the equilibrium assignment and to completely characterize that
assignment. In this sense, the two equilibrium assignments described above will only
appear here as extreme cases while, in general, the equilibrium assignment will be a
combination of both. That is, in general, in the equilibrium assignment in this model
neither there will be complete segregation of individuals by skill nor everybody with
skill below (above) the median skill in the population will be a worker (manager).
As stated in the Introduction, this paper claims that the decline in the relative
price of capital, by changing the economy’s equilibrium assignment, can produce
simultaneously both (i) a larger increase in the wage inequality between-plants than in
the wage inequality within-plants and (ii) an increase in the segregation of individuals
by skill. Despite, as mentioned above, more structure needs to be introduced in the
model to be able to completely characterize the economy’s equilibrium assignment
and its evolution, one can intuitively see already that the model presented so far can
deliver this connection. The intuition is the following. On the one hand, since there is
capital-skill complementarity in production, the decline in the relative price of capital
increases the returns to skill increasing the overall wage inequality. On the other hand,
that decline also increases the strength of the complementarity force relative to the
asymmetry force.29 Given the discussion above, this change in the strengths of the
two forces pushes the economy’s equilibrium assignment towards higher segregation
of individuals by skill and this change in the equilibrium composition of the plants
produces, in turn, larger increases in the wage inequality between-plants than in the
wage inequality within-plants.
29When the relative price of capital declines plants buy more capital. Now note that ∂
2f(x,z,k)
∂x∂z
increases with k ∀ (x, z) . Then, intuitively, the strength of the complementarity force increases as p
decreases. Alternatively, ∂∂s
µ
sµ
[θkβ+(1−θ)sβ ]
1−µ
β
¶
decreases with k ∀s. Then, intuitively, the strength
of the asymmetry force decreases as p decreases.
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The following section illustrates this connection more clearly. In order to do that,
it considers a particular version of the model described above for which it is possible
to completely characterize the equilibrium assignment of the economy for any price
of capital. Then, given that complete characterization of the equilibrium assignment,
a simple comparative static exercise shows how the decline in the relative price of
capital affects the equilibrium levels of wage inequality and of segregation by skill in
the economy.
5 A particular case of the model
Particular case.- Consider that:
(A1) µ = 1
2
.
(A2) Skill is distributed across the population according to a uniform distribution
between [0, smax].
These two assumptions help characterizing the equilibrium assignment of the econ-
omy to a larger extent than in section 4. To begin with, assumption (A1) implies
that the complete assortative assignment, the one in which individuals are perfectly
segregated by skill into different plants (that is, all individuals with the same skill are
paired among themselves), is the equilibrium assignment only when capital is free.30
Lemma 2 presents this result:31
Lemma 2. When µ = 1
2
, the complete assortative assignment is the equilibrium
assignment of the economy if and only if p = 0.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When capital is free, plants buy
an infinite amount of it.32 Then, if µ = 1
2
, the asymmetry in production between
the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker disappears. To see this, simply
note that, in that case, the plants’ production function of net output is h(x, z, 0) =
(1− θ)
1
2β (xz)
1
2 . Therefore, only the complementarity force operates in the economy
and the complete assortative assignment, where there is maximal segregation by skill,
becomes the equilibrium. However, when p 6= 0, even if µ = 1
2
, the asymmetry force
operates in the economy and it keeps the equilibrium away from perfect segregation.
30Numerical simulations of the model (available from the author upon request) suggest that the
evolution of wage inequality and of segregation by skill as the price of capital declines is qualitatively
the same in the model regardless of µ being equal to or greater than 12 . In this sense, considering
that µ = 12 simply helps illustrating that behavior. The only qualitative difference between the two
cases is that when µ > 12 the complete assortative assignment is never the equilibrium assignment
in the economy (even when capital is free) and, therefore, when p = 0 wage inequality within-plants
is greater than zero.
31Obviously, when the complete assortative assignment is the equilibrium of the economy, the
equilibrium payoff function is W (s) = 12h(s, s, p).
32To see this, just note that lim
k→∞
f3(x, z, k) = 0 ∀(x, z).
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As for assumption (A2), it helps characterizing further the equilibrium assignment
of this economy when p 6= 0. This is shown in the following three subsections. To
begin with, section 5.1 obtains the exact shape of the equilibrium assignment of
this economy for any p 6= 0 departing from an initial guess about its shape, that is
assumed to be correct. Then, using a discrete version of the economy, section 5.2
shows numerically that this guess is correct and section 5.3 obtains the equilibrium
payoffs.
5.1 A guess about the equilibrium assignment
Guess.- For each price of capital p 6= 0 there exists one value λ = λ(p) ∈ (0, 1) such
that, in the equilibrium assignment, the individuals in the interval [λsmax,m] are
workers for the individuals in the interval [m, smax] and they are paired according to
the matching function ψ(s) = s− t, where m = smax
¡
1+λ
2
¢
and t = smax
¡
1−λ
2
¢
.
Graphically, such an assignment could be represented in the following way:
 
m 0 λsmax smax 
Figure 1. Guess about the equilibrium assignment.
where the arrow indicates that the individuals in the interval of origin hire the
individuals in the interval of destination according to the matching function ψ(s).
To begin with, note that this assignment within the interval [λsmax, smax]:
• involves positive sorting between managers and workers. This is so because
∂ψ(s)
∂s > 0.
• is feasible given the uniform skill distribution assumed in (A2). To see this,
note that m is the median skill level in the interval [λsmax, smax] so that the
mass of managers in the interval [m, smax] is equal to the mass of workers in
the interval [λsmax,m] . Note also that ψ(s) is such that equation (6) below is
satisfied. It turns out that this implies that condition (4) is also satisfied.
mZ
ψ(s)
φ(s) ds =
λsmaxZ
s
φ(s) ds ∀s ∈ [m,λsmax] (6)
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If the previous guess is correct, and the individuals in the interval [λsmax, smax]
are paired among themselves in equilibrium, then the assignment of the individuals
in the interval [0, λsmax] in that same equilibrium must obviously coincide with the
solution to the assignment problem that must allocate individuals with skills distrib-
uted uniformly between [0, λsmax]. Now it turns out that the assignment problem in
which skill is distributed uniformly between [0, smax] and the assignment problem in
which skill is distributed uniformly between [0, λsmax] are isomorphic. To see this,
simply note that the latter problem is just a redefinition of the former one in which
s˜ = λs. This redefinition does not affect the basic structure of the problem for two
reasons:
1.- A uniform distribution between [0, smax] is identical to a uniform distribution
between [0, λsmax] except for a multiplicative term.33
2.- The plants production function of net output is homogeneous of degree one in
the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker. That is, h(λx, λz, p) = λh(x, z, p).
Therefore, since the only difference between the original and the redefined prob-
lem is a multiplicative term, the shape of the solution to both problems must be the
same. To be more specific, if the solution to the original assignment problem implies
that the individuals in the interval [λsmax, smax] are paired among themselves accord-
ing the rules defined above, then the solution to the redefined assignment problem
must require that the individuals in the interval [λs˜max, s˜max] must also be paired
among themselves according to the same rules. That is, individuals in the interval£
λ2smax, λm
¤
must be workers for the individuals in the interval [λm, λsmax] and they
must be paired according to the matching function ψ(s) = s− λt.
Taking this reasoning repetitively, if the guess at the beginning of this section is
correct, it is possible to know completely the exact shape of the equilibrium assign-
ment for an arbitrary price of capital p given λ (p) . In particular, the equilibrium
assignment would be such that there is an infinite number of intervals of the form£
λismax, λ
i−1smax
¤
, i = 1, 2, 3, ... and, in each one of these intervals,
• the individuals with skill s ∈ £λismax,mi¤ are workers, where mi = λi−1m.
• the individuals with skill s ∈ £mi, λi−1smax¤ are managers.34
• each manager with skill s is paired with a worker with skill ψi(s), where ψi(s) =
s− ti and ti = λi−1t.35
33Here is where the uniformity of the skill distribution and the fact that smin = 0 (assumption
(A2)) plays its role.
34In other words, Ω(s) = manager ∀s ∈
£
mi, λ
i−1smax
¤
, i = 1, 2, 3, ... and Ω(s) = worker
∀s ∈
£
λismax,mi
¤
, i = 1, 2, 3, ...
35It is immediate to see, given the discussion above for the assignment proposed within the in-
terval [λsmax, smax] , that this assignment for the whole economy involves positive sorting between
managers and workers and it is feasible given the skill distribution.
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A graphical representation of this assignment could be the following:
Interval 3
1 
m1 0 m2 m3 λsmax λ2smax smax λ3smax 
23
Interval 2 Interval 1 
and so on … 
Figure 2. Proposed equilibrium assignment.
It is also possible to know the value of λ = λ(p) that characterizes this equilibrium
assignment for a given price of capital p. The strategy is the following. As stated in
Lemma 1, the equilibrium assignment maximizes the aggregate net output produced
in the economy among all the feasible assignments. Then, if the guess at the beginning
of this section is correct and the assignment proposed above is really the equilibrium
assignment of the economy, it must necessarily maximize the economy’s aggregate
net output among (in particular) all the feasible assignments with the same shape.
Now note that, given λ, the aggregate net output produced in the economy under
the proposed assignment, Y (λ), is equal to:3637
Y (λ) =
∞X
i=1
Yi(λ) =
∞X
i=1
λi−1smaxZ
mi
h(s, ψi(s), p)φ(s) ds = (7)
=
∞X
i=1
λ2(i−1)Y1(λ) = Y1(λ)
1
1− λ2
where Yi(λ) is the net output produced within interval i and Y1(λ) is the net
output produced within the first interval. Thus, for a given price of capital p, the
value of λ = λ(p) that characterizes the equilibrium assignment described above must
be the one that solves:
max
λ
Y1(λ)
1
1− λ2
That is, λ = λ(p) is defined implicitly by the following equation:
Y 01(λ)
£
1− λ2
¤
+ Y1(λ)2λ = 0 (8)
36The first equality in the second line of (7) comes after making the following change of variable
in all the integrals, s = sˆλi−1.
37Although not shown explicitly, it must be clear that both Y (λ), Yi(λ) and Y1(λ) depend on p.
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive analytically a close form solution for the
function λ(p). However, one can still characterize this function numerically. In this
sense, (i) it decreases continuously as p increases, (ii) it approaches to 1 as p goes
to zero and (iii) it approaches to 0 as p goes to infinite. This behavior is robust to
the specific values of smax, θ and β considered. For completeness, Figure 3 represents
λ(p) using arbitrarily β = −1.5, θ = 0.5 and smax = 100.38
Figure 3. Function λ(p).
5.2 Verifying that the guess is correct
Section 5.1 derived, for any price of capital p 6= 0, the exact shape of the equilibrium
assignment of the economy described above under the assumption that an initial
guess about its shape was correct. Obviously, one still needs to check that this guess
is correct. This section proposes a simple numerical strategy to check if this is the
case.
Consider arbitrary values for p, β, θ and smax. Then, consider I different skill types
evenly distributed over the interval (0, smax) and the corresponding I different skill
types that are paired with them according to the proposed equilibrium assignment for
those arbitrary values of p, β, θ and smax. This produces a discrete economy withN =
2I different skill types.39 For notational convenience, denote by S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}
38The numerical strategy used to characterize the function λ(p) is available from the author upon
request. Basically, it involves solving numerically for the function h(x, z, p) and approximating the
definite integrals contained in Y1(λ), which has been done using the extrapolated Simpson’s rule.
39Since (A2) imposes that skill is distributed uniformly across the population, this description
implicitly considers that all skill types have the same mass of individuals (mass 1, without loss of
generality).
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the set of sorted skill types.
If the guess at the beginning of section 5.1 is correct, then the assignment described
in that section maximizes the aggregate net output produced in the economy among
all the feasible assignments. This implies, among other things, that the aggregate
net output produced under such an assignment by the N skill types defined above
must be equal to the maximum they could produce in isolation. Therefore, it must
not exist an alternative feasible way of pairing those N skill types that produces
more aggregate net output. Checking if this is the case is a way of verifying whether
the guess is correct or not. This can be done very easily with the following linear
programming problem.
Linear programming problem.- The aggregate net output produced in the discrete
economy defined above when the price of capital is p can be expressed as:40
Y =
X
l,j
apljelj (9)
where:
• aplj denotes the net output optimally produced by a plant composed of one
individual with skill sl and one individual with skill sj when the price of capital
is p. That is, aplj ≡ max {h(sl, sj, p), h(sj, sl, p)} .
• elj denotes the fraction of individuals with skill sl that are paired with individ-
uals with skill sj. For instance, elj = 1 when all the individuals with skill sl are
paired with individuals with skill sj, and elj = 0 when no individual with skill
sl is paired with an individual with skill sj.
Obviously, the assignments described by the elj0s must be feasible. In particular,
they must satisfy the following easy-to-interpret conditions:
elj ∈ [0, 1] ∀l, j = 1, ..., N (10)X
l
elj = 1 ∀l = 1, ..., N (11)
X
j
elj = 1 ∀j = 1, ..., N (12)
elj = ejl ∀l, j = 1, ..., N (13)
40See Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) for a somehow similar problem.
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Then, for any price of capital p, the assignment among the N skill types defined
above that maximizes the aggregate net output that they can produce in isolation is
simply the solution to the linear programming problem that looks for the elj0s that
maximize (9) subject to conditions (10)-(13). Now, it turns out that the optimal
assignment of those N skill types obtained solving this maximization problem always
coincides with the one disposed by the proposed equilibrium assignment derived in
section 5.1.4142 This result is robust to the specific values of the parameters of the
model and of I considered.43 Then, one could argue that the guess is really correct
and that the assignment proposed in section 5.1 is really the equilibrium assignment
of the economy.
5.3 Wages in the equilibrium assignment
Section 5.1 derived the exact shape of the equilibrium assignment departing from an
initial guess that the strategy proposed in section 5.2 showed to be correct. Then, the
only thing left to completely characterize the equilibrium assignment of the economy
is to determine everybody’s payoff in that equilibrium. This section proposes a nu-
merical strategy that can deliver the equilibrium payoff of the N different skill types
described in section 5.2.44 In this sense, it is reasonable to expect that, when I is a
large number, this strategy provides a good approximation to the actual equilibrium
payoff function.
In the discrete economy described in section 5.2, denote by s∗l the skill type that
is optimally paired with the skill type sl ∈ S according to the solution to the linear
programming problem proposed in that section. As already explained, for each sl that
s∗l is equal to the one proposed by the equilibrium assignment described in section
5.1. Then, conditions (3) and (5) together impose the following restrictions on the
equilibrium payoffs:
W (sl) +W (s∗l ) = max {h(sl, s∗l , p), h(s∗l , sl, p)} ∀l = 1, 2, .., N (14)
41It is important to mention that, although condition (10) allows fractional assignment (the elj 0s
are allowed to take any value in the interval [0, 1] , and not only 0 or 1), the solution to this
maximization problem always involves corner solutions (that is, the optimal elj 0s are always either
0 or 1) as in the proposed equilibrium assignment.
42This solution can be found numerically using the linear programming tools in Matlab. The
exact Matlab program employed to obtain it is available from the author upon request. Basically,
it solves the problem using a Matlab’s large scale algorithm based on interior point methods.
43Obviously, the larger I the more guarantees this procedure provides.
44Alternatively, and since the exact shape of the equilibrium assignment is already known, one
could use rather standard techniques in the assignment literature to derive analytically an expression
for the equilibrium payoff function. That expression, however, is almost intractable (mainly due to
the complexity of the functional form adopted in (1)) and, eventually, one still needs to resort to
numerical analysis to show the behavior of wages in the model.
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W (sl) =
½max
sj
[max {h(sl, sj, p), h(sj, sl, p)}−W (sj)]
s.t. sj ∈ S
∀l = 1, 2, .., N (15)
Together, conditions (14) and (15) impose some bounds on each W (s) but do
not completely define it. In other words, it is possible to find different equilibrium
payoff functions associated to the same equilibrium assignment. This non-uniqueness
is due to the discreteness of the economy (this does not happen in a continuous
economy) but, fortunately, it is not a big problem for the purposes of this paper.
On the one hand, the bounds imposed by conditions (14) and (15) on each W (s) for
a given equilibrium assignment are tighter the greater the number of skill types in
the economy. Thus, by considering sufficiently large values of I one can make the
range of variation (across all the equilibrium payoff functions associated to the same
equilibrium assignment) of any W (s) very small. On the other hand, even if a given
W (s) varies a little bit across the different equilibrium payoff functions consistent
with a given equilibrium assignment, this has very little effect on the variables that
are relevant for this paper since they are aggregate variables (skill premium, wage
inequality between- and within-plants, ...). These two claims are confirmed by the
following iterative procedure that, departing from an initial guess about everybody’s
equilibrium payoff, can deliver a set of equilibrium payoffs for everybody consistent
with a given equilibrium assignment:
1.- Make a guess about everybody’s equilibrium payoff associated with a given
equilibrium assignment.
2.- Define a new set of equilibrium payoffs, W˜ (s), as:
W˜ (sl) =
½max
sj
[max {h(sl, sj, p), h(sj, sl, p)}−W (sj)]
s.t. sj ∈ S
∀l = 1, 2, .., N
3.- Check if W˜ (s) satisfies conditions (14) and (15).
4.- If W˜ (s) satisfies condition (14) but not condition (15), then begin the process
again using Wˆ (s) as the initial guess, where Wˆ (s) is defined as:
Wˆ (sl) =
½max
sj
h
max {h(sl, sj, p), h(sj, sl, p)}− W˜ (sj)
i
s.t. sj ∈ S
∀l = 1, 2, .., N
5.- If W˜ (s) satisfies condition (15) but not condition (14), then begin the process
again using Wˆ (s) as the initial guess, where Wˆ (s) is defined as:
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Wˆ (sl) = W˜ (sl) +
1
2
h
max {h(sl, s∗l , p), h(s∗l , sl, p)}− W˜ (sl)− W˜ (s∗l )
i
∀l = 1, 2, .., N
(16)
6.- If W˜ (s) fails to satisfy both conditions (14) and (15), then begin the process
again using Wˆ (s) as the initial guess, where Wˆ (s) is defined as in equation (16).
As mentioned above, it turns out that:
• departing from an initial guess, this iterative procedure always converge to a
set of payoffs satisfying conditions (14) and (15) and, therefore, consistent with
the equilibrium assignment being considered.
• by changing the initial guess, this iterative procedure produces different sets of
equilibrium payoffs associated to the same equilibrium assignment.
• when I is large, there is very little difference between the different sets of equi-
librium payoffs systems associated to a given equilibrium assignment. In fact,
they all behave almost identically in terms of the skill premium, and the over-
all, between-plants and within-plants wage inequality, that are the most relevant
variables for this paper.
5.4 Evolution of the equilibrium as p decreases
From the results derived in the previous sections it is possible to know, for any price
of capital, who is paired with whom in the equilibrium assignment and everybody’s
payoff. This information is enough to obtain the predictions of the model in terms
of wage inequality and of segregation by skill as the price of capital decreases. It
turns out that these predictions are qualitatively the same regardless of the specific
parameter values considered. In this sense, all the results presented in this section
were obtained using arbitrarily β = −1.5, θ = 0.5, smax = 100 and I = 50.
To begin with note, from Figure 3, that the smaller the price of capital the higher
the value of λ = λ (p). Therefore, as p decreases, the equilibrium assignment in the
economy changes qualitatively as in Figure 4:45
45In each one of the equilibrium assignments depicted in Figure 4 there is an infinite number of
intervals but only the first intervals are shown.
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0 smax s1  
0 
p 
and so on …. 
0 smax 
0 smax 
0 smax 
Interval 1 
Interval 1 
Int.1Int.2
Int.2
Int. 2
Int.3
Int.3 Int.4 
Figure 4. Evolution of the equilibrium assignment as p decreases
Obviously, this change in the equilibrium assignment affects the extent of indi-
viduals’ segregation by skill in the economy. In this sense, Lemma 3 shows that
individuals’ segregation by skill increases in the model as the price of capital de-
creases.
Lemma 3. As p decreases, the difference between the skill of the manager and the
skill of the worker within plants in equilibrium decreases in average.
Note also how this model integrates the equilibrium assignments in Kremer (1993)
and in Lucas (1978) within the same framework as two extreme cases. In particular,
when p = 0 (λ = 1) the equilibrium presents complete segregation of individuals by
skill as in Kremer (1993). Instead, as p goes to infinite (λ goes to 0) the equilibrium
assignment moves towards the one in Lucas (1978) in the sense that there is a cutoff
level of skill such that everybody above that level is a manager and everybody below
it is a worker. The essence of this paper comes from the transition from one kind of
equilibrium to the other.
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As for the predictions of the model regarding the evolution of wage inequality,
consider the following decomposition of the overall wage inequality (σ2T ) into the
between-plants (σ2BP ) and the within-plants (σ
2
WP ) wage inequality:
46
σ2T =
NP
l=1
£
W (sl)− W¯
¤2
N
=
=
JP
j=1
2
£
W¯ j − W¯
¤2
N
+
JP
j=1
³£
W (sj1)− W¯ j
¤2
+
£
W (sj2)− W¯ j
¤2´
N
=
= σ2BP + σ
2
WP (17)
where W¯ is the average wage in the economy’s equilibrium assignment and W¯ j
is the average wage in the jth plant, j = 1, 2, ..., J = N/2, that in the equilibrium
assignment is composed of two individuals, one with skill sj1 and another one with
skill sj2. In the second line of equation (17), the first term is the variance in average
wage across plants and the second term averages the wage inequality within each
type of plant in equilibrium. Thus, one could consider the former a measure of wage
inequality between-plants, σ2BP , and the latter a measure of wage inequality within-
plants, σ2WP .
Figures 5 and 6 show that both σ2BP , σ
2
T and the ratio
σ2BP
σ2T
increase continuously
as p decreases. Instead, σ2WP first increases slightly when p decreases but eventually
decreases towards 0 as p goes to 0.47
46This decomposition is similar to the one in Davis and Haltiwanger (1991).
47Recall that when p = 0 the economy’s equilibrium assignment is the complete assortative as-
signment. Therefore, when p = 0 there is not skill heterogeneity within plants, σ2WP = 0 and
σ2BP = σ
2
T .
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Figure 5. Evolution of the overall, between-plants and within-plants wage inequality.
Figure 6. Evolution of σ
2
BP
σ2T
.
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Another measure of wage inequality frequently used in the literature is the skill
premium. In this sense, one could define the skill premium in this model as the
average wage in equilibrium for individuals with skill above smedian over the same
measure for individuals with skill equal or lower than smedian. As Figure 7 shows,
the model clearly predicts an increase in this measure of the skill premium when p
decreases.48
Figure 7. Evolution of the skill premium.
Finally, the model has another interesting prediction. In this sense, if one defines
a plant’s labor productivity as half the net output it produces, then the variance of
labor productivity across plants coincides in this model with the variance of average
wage across plants, that is, with σ2BP . Thus, according to Figure 5, the model also
predicts an increase in the dispersion in labor productivity across plants when p
decreases.49 The same conclusion can be obtained considering the 90-10 differential
of the log of labor productivity across plants, that also increases in the model when
p decreases.
All these predictions of the model when the economy faces a declining relative
price of capital (as observed empirically in the U.S.) are broadly consistent with the
empirical evidence.50 In this sense, as mentioned in the Introduction, the empirical
evidence suggests that, overall, over the last few decades in the U.S. there has been:
48The prediction of the model that the skill premium increases as p decreases is robust to the
cutoff level of skill used to compute the premium.
49This model considers that skill is perfectly observable. Alternatively, if someone who does not
observe skill perfectly analyzes this economy, he would conclude that there are TFP differences
across plants, and that the dispersion in TFP across plants increases when p decreases.
50Although not shown here, the model also predicts that both the aggregate output and the
aggregate amount of capital in the economy increase smoothly as the price of capital declines. The
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• an increase in the segregation of workers by skill into separate plants.51
• a large increase in the overall and the between-plants wage inequality and a
slight increase in the within-plants wage inequality, and therefore an increase in
the ratio σ
2
BP
σ2T
.5253
• an increase in the skill premium.54
• an increase in the dispersion of labor productivity across plants.55
These are overall patterns and the model, admittedly stylized, succeeds in captur-
ing them. Of course, one would need to introduce additional elements into the model
to be able to account for more detailed aspects of the evolution of these variables. For
instance, to account for the decline in the skill premium observed in the U.S. during
the second half of the 1970s (although it is clear in the literature that, overall, the
skill premium has increased over the last few decades).
6 Conclusion
Empirical evidence for the U.S. suggests that, over the last few decades, (i) wage
inequality between-plants has risen much more than wage inequality within-plants
and (ii) there has been an increase in the segregation of workers by skill into separate
plants. This paper presents a frictionless assignment model that is able to produce
simultaneously these two features as the result of the decline in the relative price of
same happens with the dispersion in capital holdings across plants. These predictions are also
broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.
51As mentioned in the Introduction, Kremer and Maskin (1996) provide several pieces of evidence
in this direction. For instance, they find that, in the U.S. manufacturing sector, production workers
are now more likely to be together in the same plants (the correlation of a dummy variable for being
production worker in the same plant rose from 0.195 to 0.228 between 1976 and 1987).
52This is documented in Dunne et al. (2004). In particular they find that both the overall and
the between-plants wage inequality increased monotonically between 1975 and 1992 in the U.S.
manufacturing sector, while the within-plants wage inequality only increased slightly and it even
declined at some moments. As a consequence, the ratio σ
2
BP
σ2T
increased from around 0.53 in 1977 to
around 0.64 in 1992.
53As seen in Figure 5, the exact impact on wage inequality within-plants of a given decline in the
relative price of capital is ambiguous. The model needs to be evaluated quantitatively in order to
solve that ambiguity. This is the purpose of Gavilan (2006).
54A large empirical literature documents this feature. As an example, Autor, Katz and Krueger
(1998) report that the log relative wage of college and post-college workers to high-school workers
went from 0.465 in 1970 to 0.557 in 1996.
55This is documented in Dunne et al. (2004). In particular they find that the 90-10 differential of
the log of labor productivity across U.S. manufacturing plants increased from around 1.7 to around
1.9 during the period 1975-92.
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capital, while still obtaining results consistent with the evidence regarding the skill
premium and the dispersion in labor productivity across plants.
It is important to mention that the connection shown in this paper between wage
inequality, individuals’ segregation by skill and the relative price of capital is not an
exclusive feature of the particular functional form in (1) or of the particular version
of the model considered in section 5. With these elements one can illustrate the
connection more clearly but the same connection can be found numerically using
different functional forms or skill distributions.56
In the model presented above a decline in the relative price of capital always
increases wage inequality. However, empirically, while in the U.S. the relative price of
capital has fallen at least since the 1950’s, only after the 1970’s wage inequality has
increased substantially. In defence of the model one could argue two things. First,
although the relative price of capital has fallen at least since the 1950’s, Krusell et
al. (2000) report that its rate of decline accelerated considerably in the period 1975-
92 relative to the period 1954-75. This is precisely when wage inequality increased
the most. And second, as mentioned in the Introduction, other factors besides the
relative price of capital may have affected the extent of wage inequality in the economy
too. Considering some of these factors (and their evolution over time) would certainly
increase the empirical fit of the model. For instance, a natural extension of the general
framework presented here would be to consider simultaneously both changes in the
economy’s skill distribution (as in Kremer and Maskin (1996)) and in the relative
price of capital. In fact, a careful calibration of this extension of the model could be
very informative about what fraction of the recent increase in wage inequality is due
to changes in the economy’s skill distribution and what is due to the decline in the
relative price of capital.
Finally, a couple of extensions would increase the realism of the model and would
make it more suitable for a quantitative examination. First, it would be nice to drop
the restriction that plants need to have size two (in terms of individuals) and to in-
troduce endogenous plant size. This could be done, for instance, within a hierarchical
framework like the one in Garicano and Rossi (2005) and could produce interesting
implications regarding the distribution of plant sizes in the economy and its evolu-
tion over time. And second, it would be nice to consider more than one sector in the
economy. Then, individuals would have to allocate themselves across plants, occu-
pations and sectors. This set up would be convenient, for instance, to understand
how the assignment across sectors changes depending on their degrees of skill-biased
technological change.
56In the case of alternative functional forms, they must still satisfy the crucial properties estab-
lished in section 2. Results under some alternative specifications are available from the author upon
request.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Existence. The results in Gretsky et al. (1992) and in Kaneko and Wood-
ers (1986), for a more general assignment problem than the one considered here,
guarantee the existence of the equilibrium in this paper.
(ii) Efficiency. Consider that the equilibrium assignment for an arbitrary price
of capital p is given by {Ω, ψ,W} and produces an aggregate net output equal to
Y . Now, by contradiction with statement (ii) of this Lemma, assume that there
is another feasible assignment,
n
Ωˆ, ψˆ, Wˆ
o
, that produces an aggregate net output
Yˆ > Y .
We know that:
Y =
Z
s∈M
h(s, ψ(s), p)φ (s) ds =
=
Z
s∈M
[W (s) +W (ψ(s))]φ (s) ds = (18)
=
Z
s∈Mˆ
h
W (s) +W (ψˆ(s))
i
φ (s) ds
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In equation (18), the equality in the first line comes by definition. Instead, the
equality in the second line comes from the equilibrium conditions (3) and (5). Finally,
the equality in the third line holds since the assignments in
n
Ωˆ, ψˆ, Wˆ
o
are also feasible
given the skill distribution. Basically, the second and third lines in this equation are
simply two different ways of aggregating the equilibrium wages under {Ω, ψ,W}.
Analogously, we know that:
Yˆ =
Z
s∈Mˆ
h(s, ψˆ(s), p)φ (s) ds (19)
Now, combining equations (18) and (19), and using the fact that Yˆ > Y, one can
easily see that there must exist at least one skill value s ∈ Mˆ for which h(s, ψˆ(s), p) >
W (s) +W (ψˆ(s)). But this contradicts condition (5) of the equilibrium assignment.
Therefore, the assumption above that there exists a feasible assignment different from
the equilibrium one that produces more aggregate net output is incorrect. This proves
statement (ii) of this Lemma.
(iii) Within plant assignment. Consider that two individuals with skills a and
b, a 6= b, are together in the same plant in the equilibrium assignment for an arbi-
trary price of capital p. Without loss of generality, consider that a > b. Now, by
contradiction with statement (iii) of this Lemma, assume that, in that plant, the in-
dividual with skill a is the worker and the individual with skill b is the manager. But
this contradicts efficiency of the equilibrium assignment. This is so because, in that
plant, the output could be larger by changing the assignment of occupations within
the plant. That is,
h(a, b, p) > h(b, a, p)
Therefore, if this plant exists in the equilibrium assignment, the individual with
skill a must always be the manager.
(iv) Positive Sorting. Consider that in the equilibrium assignment for an arbitrary
price of capital p two individuals with skills a and b, such that a > b, are managers.
Now, by contradiction with statement (iv) of this Lemma, assume that they are paired
with workers of skills c and d, respectively, such that c < d.
By statement (iii) in this Lemma, we know that a ≥ c and b ≥ d. Combining
these inequalities with the previous ones, we know that a > b ≥ d > c. Under these
circumstances, the fact that ∂
2h(x,z,p)
∂x∂z > 0 implies that:
h(a, d, p) + h(b, c, p) > h(a, c, p) + h(b, d, p)
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This implies that the economy’s aggregate net output is not maximized when
individuals with skills a and b (such that a > b) are paired with individuals of skills
c and d (such that d > c), respectively. Therefore, by statement (ii) in this Lemma,
that cannot constitute an equilibrium assignment. This proves statement (iv) of this
Lemma.
(v) Payoff increasing with skill. Consider, against statement (v) of this Lemma,
that in the equilibrium assignment for an arbitrary price of capital p it happens that
a > b but W (a) ≤ W (b). In this equilibrium, one of the following two cases must
happen:
• Case 1: The individual with skill b is paired with an individual with skill a.
• Case 2: The individual with skill b is paired with an individual with skill c 6= a.
In both cases, someone has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium assign-
ment. This is a contradiction and, therefore, it must always happen that, under the
equilibrium assignment, W (a) > W (b) whenever a > b.
In Case 1, the individual with skill a is better off by leaving the individual with
skill b and matching with another individual with skill a. This is so because:
W (a) +W (a) ≤W (a) +W (b) = h(a, b, p) < h(a, a, p)
In Case 2, the individual with skill c is better off by leaving the individual with
skill b and matching with one individual with skill a. This is so because:
W (a)+W (c) ≤W (b)+W (c) = max {h(b, c, p), h(c, b, p)} < max {h(a, c, p), h(c, a, p)}¥
Proof of Lemma 2
(i)When µ = 1
2
, the complete assortative assignment is the equilibrium assignment
of the economy if p = 0.
Assume that in the equilibrium assignment when p = 0 individuals with an
arbitrary skill a are paired with individuals with skill b 6= a. In this case, since
h(x, z, 0) = (1− θ)
1
2β (xz)
1
2 , it is very easy to show that:
h(a, a, 0) + h(b, b, 0) > 2h(a, b, 0)
But this implies that the economy’s aggregate net output is not maximized when
individuals with skill a are paired with individuals with skill b 6= a. Therefore, by
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Lemma 1, that can not constitute an equilibrium assignment, and the equilibrium
assignment when p = 0 requires that all the individuals of a given skill level are
paired among themselves. That is, Ω(s) = {worker,manager} and ψ(s) = s ∀s ∈
[smin, smax] in the equilibrium.
(ii) When µ = 1
2
, the complete assortative assignment is the equilibrium assign-
ment of the economy only if p = 0.
Assume, by contradiction, that p 6= 0 and the complete assortative assignment is
the equilibrium assignment of the economy. Because in equilibrium none has incentive
to move, it must happen (in particular) that, ∀a ∈ [smin, smax] and ∀λ ∈ [smina , 1]:
F (a, λa, p) ≡ h(a, λa, p)− 1
2
[h(a, a, p) + h(λa, λa, p)] ≤ 0 (20)
Now note that F (a, λa, p)|λ=1 = 0 and that:
Fλ(a, λa, p) = a
∙
h2(a, λa, p)−
1
2
[h1(λa, λa, p) + h2(λa, λa, p)]
¸
(21)
Evaluating (21) at λ = 1 one gets that:
Fλ(a, λa, p)|λ=1 =
a
2
[h2(a, a, p)− h1(a, a, p)] =
=
a
2
[f2(a, a, k∗aa)− f1(a, a, k∗aa)]
where k∗aa is the amount of capital that a plant composed of two individuals with
skill a optimally buys and last the equality comes from applying the envelope theorem.
Now note that, for the production function in (1), since µ = 1
2
it happens that:
f2(a, a, k∗aa)− f1(a, a, k∗aa) < 0 ∀a
Therefore, Fλ(a, λa, p)|λ=1 < 0 which contradicts (20), as there must exist a λ
sufficiently close to 1 for which F (a, λa, p) > 0. This proves this part of the Lemma.¥
Proof of Lemma 3
The difference between the skill of the manager and the skill of the worker for all
plants in interval i in the equilibrium assignment for an arbitrary price of capital p
is equal to:
s− ψi (s) = ti = λi−1smax
µ
1− λ
2
¶
Moreover, given the economy’s skill distribution, the relative weight of interval i
in the whole economy is equal to:
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λi−1smaxZ
λismax
φ(s) ds = λi−1 (1− λ)
Therefore, the average difference between the skill of the manager and the skill of
the worker within the plants that exit in the equilibrium assignment for an arbitrary
price of capital p, dif(p), is equal to:
dif(p) =
∞X
i=1
³smax
2
´
(1− λ)2 λ2i−2 =
³smax
2
´ (1− λ)2
1− λ2
=
³smax
2
´ 1− λ
1 + λ
Now, since ∂λ(p)∂p < 0 (just see Figure 3), it is immediate to show that
∂dif(p)
∂p > 0.¥
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